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BIBLIOGRAPHY  235 when condemning the latter (3.582).  The proliferation ofthreatening metaphors 
suggested transgression of  organic law.  The falsehoods ofthe Old Masters were 
thus dangerously chaotic and unsettling.  They erred by rejecting natural truth for 
synthetic, imaginative compositions.  By failing to study tree form in the field, the 
old masters gave primacy to human artifice over natural ingenuity.  In Ruskin's 
mind, such a preference for human design over natural truth articulated a desire to 
shape and exploit nature, and this issue became more pressing in the decade that 
followed.  As will become apparent when looking at 'The Work of  Iron' and 'The 
Law of  Help', Ruskin began to prophesy a breakdown of  ecological order in the real 
world that would be attended with yet more frightening consequences. 
It is significant that when Ruskin turned to the tree painting of  Turner and 
Titian, he did not use metaphor at all, because he believed their compositions 
resembled only real trees.  His descriptions therefore read like factual accounts: 
In Turner's Marly [ ...  ] we have [ ...  ] perfect and ceaseless intricacy, 
to oppose to Poussin, perfect and unbroken repose to oppose to 
Hobbima [ ...  ] We have in it the admirably drawn stems, instead of 
the claws of  serpents; full, transparent, boundless intricacy [ ...  ] 
instead of  perpetual repetition of  one mechanical touch (3.593). 
Ruskin drew attention to his use of  metaphor to describe falsehood, and non-
figurative language to depict 'truth'.  Despite his own use of  figurative, decorative 
language, Ruskin claimed to equate 'plain speaking' with truth.  The employment of 
metaphor in 'Of  Truth of  Vegetation' served Ruskin's purpose at this time, but as 
his vision of  nature expanded, the limitations of  metaphor, and the power of  analogy 
to unlock the secrets of  ecology, would be revealed. 
56 Much time is wasted by human beings, in general, on establishment 
of  systems; and it often takes more labour to master the intricacies of 
an artificial connection, than to remember the separate facts which 
are so carefully connected (5.  18). 
Logical systems were described as unnatural, synthetic, laborious, and unhelpful. 
Ruskin's attack on his former purposes tellingly evoked a natural analogy: 
System-makers, in general, are not of  much more use, each in his 
own domain, than, in that of  Pomona, the old women who tie cherries 
upon sticks, for the more convenient portableness of  the same (5.  18). 
Not for the last time Ruskin turned to cherries for natural wisdom.  His metaphor 
indicated growing indebtedness to organic models of  knowledge and creativity: 
To cultivate well, and choose well, your cherries, is of some 
importance; but ifthey can be had in their own wild way of  clustering 
about their crabbed stalk, it is a better connection for them than any 
other; and if  they cannot, then, so that they be not bruised, it makes to 
a boy of  a practical disposition not much difference whether he gets 
them by handfuls, or in beaded symmetry on the exalted stick (5.  18). 
Only the original, organic organisation (the 'clustering about their crabbed stalk' of 
cherries) was genuinely truthful.  All subsequent efforts to take this original apart, to 
isolate components, and to re-organise them, were flawed from the start.  Whether 
one chose to take 'handfuls' or 'beads' of  truth was ultimately irrelevant, once this 
dismemberment had taken place.  No logical system could re-create this original 
form.  How to proceed became in part a personal choice, and in declaring this, 
Ruskin divested himself of  the absolute commitment to objectivity upon which his 
earlier work had insisted, and re-modelled himself as 'a boy of  practical disposition' 
whose subsequent divisions oftrees and mountains would follow organic order, 
67 So  long as  we choose to  contend rather with our fellows than with 
our faults, and make battlefield of  our meadows instead of  pasture -
so long, truly [ ...  ] the gates of Eden remain barred close enough, till 
we have sheathed the sharper flame of our own passions, and broken 
down the closer gates of  our own hearts (7.  14). 
Ruskin's social revolution, he hoped, would take place within both self and society, 
guided at all times by the example offered by the harmonious interactions of  leaves. 
Ruskin described the task of  growing a tree as one undertaken by the collective 
effort of  individual leaves in the capturing of  sunlight, creation of  resources, and 
transport ofthese to roots and stems.  He directed much attention to the work of 
these individuals, and it is therefore worth considering his treatment ofthem, before 
moving on to his depiction oflarger social groupings within the community of 
leaves. 
At the most obvious level, the individual leaves are described in terms that 
emphasise their inherently social faculties.  In Chapter II, 'The Leaf  Orders', he 
described broadleaved trees as 'builders with the shield', and conifers as 'builders 
wi th the sword', defining the former as essentially nurturing, and the latter as 
essentially warlike: 
Builders with the sword [ ...  ] have sharp leaves in the shape of 
swords, and the young buds, instead of  being as numerous as the 
leaves, crouching each under a leaf-shadow, are few in number, and 
grow fearlessly, each in the midst of  a sheaf of swords (7. 23). 
Ruskin's division mimicked that between sublime and picturesque landscapes.  The 
coniferous dwellers in 'savage places' were antisocial individualists, or devoted only 
to narrow clan instincts.  Broadleaves, on the other hand, lived 'in pleasant places', 
and were committed to a broader co-operative social model of  care: 
78 through winter's shieldless sleep' (7. 35).  At first sight, such a reading of  a leafs 
life as a brief  recapitulation of  that of  all other leaves might seem to offer little scope 
for individual, purposeful creativity, but this would be a misleading analysis of 
Ruskin's position on individuality and community. 
The leaf, he argued, 'accepts its prepared place' in 'tender continuance of 
voluntary change', a claim that might appear to indicate that the individual leaf was 
entirely subsumed to the task oftree building, and had little ability to express its 
own individual agency (7. 49).  However, the growth of  a tree was described as 
'always visibly the result of  a volition on the part ofthe leaf, meeting an external 
force or fate, to which it is never passively subjected' (7. 49).  Each leafwas, 
therefore, an independent agent, and chose to direct its energies 'in steady 
inheritance of  resolution to reach forward' and to overcome difficulties for the 
greater social good (7. 86).  Their 'life of  endurance, effort, and various success' 
was not one of  drudgery, for it resulted from the independent 'will or aim of  those 
sprays'.  Each leaf, by its location in a particular part of  the tree, faced different 
challenges in the struggle to find light, and so had to find individual solutions to 
these problems.  Their choices in these matters permitted them to express their own 
creativity, without becoming engaged in competition with other leaves.  Tree 
builders co-operated despite hardship: 'the leaf, full of  fears and affections, shrinks 
and seeks, as it obeys', while humans were motivated by greed and competition (7. 
85).  These leaves, active but never competitive, were not automata controlled by a 
central authority, but part of  a joyful collective effort that began with individual will. 
What they obeyed was not a hierarchical command structure, but laws of  ecological 
survival that demanded co-operative and mutualistic creative practices, something 
Ruskin argued in chapter IV: 
For the leaves, as we shall see immediately, are the feeders of  the 
plant.  Their own orderly habits of  succession must not interfere with 
80 those below them.  On the contrary, each leaf emerged at a point on the stern that 
permitted maximum light to pass beneath.  The alternate, opposite, and spiral 
patterns of  leaf emergence had corne into existence in order to maximise sharing of 
this primary natural resource.  Their beauty, Ruskin argued, arose from the success 
of  such co-operative endeavours.  In incredible detail, Ruskin's botanical narrative 
tracked the physical challenges the families of  leaves faced as they sought to fulfil 
their 'felicitous function'.  In the attendant social analogies, Ruskin described how 
human society might be transformed by application of  the leafy values of  self-
sacrifice and co-operation.  Like many radical social thinkers of  the 1800s, he faced 
the problem of  reconciling individualism and community.  He did so by stressing 
that just as the leaves of  a tree were bound inexorably together, so the 
interdependencies of  humans required that they relinquish competitive modes of 
organisation: 'in the nation you find everyone scrambling for his neighbour's 
place', unable to understand that competition, not collectivity, destroyed 
individuality (7.42). 
Describing three buds at the tip of  a young stern, Ruskin adopted filial 
language to explain their solution to the problem of  survival: 
Now these three buds, though differently placed, have all one mind 
[  ... J Everyone would like, ifhe could, to grow upright, and it is 
because the midmost one has entirely his own way in this matter, that 
he is largest.  He is an elder brother; his birthright is to  grow straight 
towards the sky (7.74). 
The 'elder brother's environmental advantage gave him the best chance of  reaching 
sufficient light for photosynthesis, but did not lead to competition for resources: 
All the three buds [ ...  J have the same desire;- which is [ ...  ] to grow 
as straight as he can towards bright heaven [ ...  J So far as they can, in 
82 from the moment of  his complete majority, pays a stated tax to the 
stalk; that is to say, collects for it a certain quantity of  wood (7.59). 
The natural justice of  the community, made up households or families ofleaves, 
operated in Ruskin's mind as an idealised society, in which harmonious social 
relations were dependent upon an unreflexive sense of  place, belonging, and duty. 
The mature tree constructed in this way was akin to a nation: 
A tree is born without a head.  It has got to make its own head.  It is 
born like a little family from which a great nation is to spring; and at 
a certain time under peculiar external circumstances, this nation [  ...  ] 
gives itself a new political constitution, and sends out branch 
colonies, which enforce forms of  law and life entirely different from 
those of  the parent state.  That is the history of  the state.  It is also the 
history of  a tree (7. 73). 
A society that builds 'upwards' from its most humble constituents was hardly one 
made up of  rulers and hierarchy.  Ruskin's idea of  a nation that provided a 
constitution for itself, rather than having one imposed, was, in some respects, a little 
anarchistic.  Despite the anti-democratic tone of  Ruskin's figuration of  brothers who 
seek fellowship rather than equality, the society in Ruskin's tree narrative was built 
from below, on organic principles, and empowered by its own creative acts of 
building.  Instead of  being a passive society, submitting to the exigencies of  natural 
law, this one strived against external imperatives, and in doing so, came to define 
itself.  The only authority in this society was that oftheir shared 'heart law'. 
XI.  Living nature 
When Ruskin spoke of 'families' ofleaves that acted 'in order not to invade the 
privileges of other people in their neighbourhood' (7. 48), he described the organic 
modes of social organisation he wished to promote.  It is, however, also worth 
85 noticing the linguistic transition in this passage, in which leaves became 'people', 
because this reveals another persistent feature of  Ruskin's ecological thought. 
Throughout the chapters, trees were always on the verge of  attaining sentience, a 
fact that permits us to see the degree to which an increasingly biocentric reading of 
nature was disturbing the kind of  fixed, hierarchical classifications of  nature that had 
characterised traditional Christian accounts.  What emerges from examination of 
these issues in 'Of  Leaf  Beauty' is a clearer picture of  the degree to which Ruskin 
was contemplating a radical revision of  ideas about the place of  humanity within 
Creation.  If  all of  nature was connected and mutually dependent, how could human 
life be regarded as either special or separate?  Was it possible for Ruskin to make a 
decisive break from anthropomorphic readings of  nature, and what might be the 
consequences of  so doing? 
Ruskin's preoccupation with such questions began in the first chapter of 'Of 
LeafBeauty', in which he considered what 'man' could learn from the earth: 
In the conditions which we have traced in its rocks, there could only 
be seen preparation for his existence [ ...  J but vegetation is to it as an 
imperfect soul, given to meet the soul of  man. The earth in its depths 
must remain dead and cold, incapable except of  slow crystalline 
change; but at its surface, which human beings look upon and deal 
with, it ministers to them through a veil of  strange intermediate being 
(7.  14). 
What this proposed was not so much a hierarchy of  nature, but a continuum.  The 
boundaries between rocks and plants, and between plants and humans, had become 
permeable.  The 'imperfect soul' of  vegetation seemed to strive for full 
consciousness as it fulfilled its divine role of  mediation.  The 'strange intermediate 
being' emerged as a synthesis of  characteristics from the realms of  flora and fauna: 
it 'breathes, but has no voice; moves, but cannot leave its appointed place; passes 
86 provided Ruskin's most complete statement of  ecological principles, and a perfect 
example of  what I would describe as an ecologically ordered text. 
The movement from microcosm to macrocosm (from the framing detail of 
the rusted wells to the 'functions of  iron' in nature, culture, and public life) that I 
have indicated was not just an indicator of  Ruskin's bravura lecturing style.  It 
showed his desire to trace complex connections of  cause and effect within the 
environment, and to overturn complacency by asking his audience to glimpse new 
ways of  perceiving nature and their place within it.  In speaking of  the wells, Ruskin 
challenged what he described as their perception that 'rusty iron [must be] spoiled 
iron'.  Counter-intuitively, he insisted that 'it is not a fault in the iron, but a virtue, to 
be so fond of  getting rusted, for in that condition it fulfils its most important 
functions in the universe', so that 'in a certain sense, and almost a literal one, we 
may say that iron rusted is Living; but when pure or polished, Dead' (16. 376-7).  In 
his description ofthe oxidisation process, iron actively inhaled air, revealing itself 
and oxygen as dynamic substances that participated in physical transformations.  By 
respiring and developing, as we do, iron became part of  a communion of  living and 
nearly living organisms and substances that interacted at a foundational level. 
Iron and other metals only reached their 'most perfect and useful state' when 
they had 'breath put into them', a physical, but also spiritual, breath oflife from 
which all else began (16.376,377).  The dynamic changes which the consummation 
of  oxygen and iron was capable of  enacting were multiple and wide-ranging, 
something that Ruskin outlined as he related the various uses made by nature of  iron 
oxide.  As he pointed out, 'the main service of  this metal, and of  all other metals, to 
us, is not in making knives, and scissors, and pokers, and pans', but instead 'in 
making the ground we feed from, and nearly all the substances first needful to our 
existence' (16. 377).  The domestic uses of  metals fade into insignificance in this re-
ordered vision: 
91 Sherburne draws attention to  'the organic basis of  Ruskin's view of  unity' in 
'The Law of  Help', noting that Ruskin turned to examples from natural, rather than 
artistic realms, in order to begin his description of  composition.  36  The examples 
Ruskin cited in the first section of  the chapter were all drawn from nature.  He 
described the differing degrees to which different parts of  nature were able to 
compose themselves helpfully.  Mirroring his remarks on 'sordid' mineral formation 
in 'Of  Leaf  Beauty', Ruskin argued that in 'clouds, or stones, their atoms may 
cohere to each other, or consist with each other, but they do not help each other'.  If 
there is 'removal of  one part', this 'does not injure the rest', but 'in a plant, the 
taking away of anyone part does injure the rest', occasionally to the point of  death. 
The co-dependency of  the parts of  a plant was even more noticeable in animals: 
We may take away the branch of a tree without much harm to it; but 
not the animal's limb. Thus, intensity of  life is also intensity of 
helpfulness-completeness of  depending of  each part on all the rest. 
The ceasing of  this help is what we call corruption; and in proportion 
to the perfectness of  the help, is the dreadfulness of  the loss. The 
more intense the life has been, the more terrible is its corruption (7. 
205). 
Bizup regards the depiction of  the body in 'The Law of  Help' as a clear marker of 
Ruskin's organicism and anti-materialism.  Quite rightly, he points out the way that 
the body acts for Ruskin as a prime model for demonstrating the law of 
interdependence of  things, not least because it represents a 'closed' organic system. 
This is depicted as at odds, Bizup argues, with the 'open', materialistic organisation 
ofthose modem technological systems, like railroads, which Ruskin critiques 
extensively in his work.  Whilst organic bodies are contained and mutualistic in their 
internal organisation, materialistic systems are not contained, but ever-extending, 
36.  Sherburne, p. 8. 
98 thwarting the laws of  interdependence, and acting 'as a destructive metallic 
simulacrum that constricts and threatens to supplant the organic body of  nature'  .37 
Bizup's comparison between Ruskin's depictions of  bodily form and of  railroad 
technology permits one to perceive the ecological nature of  Ruskin's organicism 
through the stress on interdependence. 
Extending his natural analogy of corruption, Ruskin showed the opposite 
side of  the 'Law of  Help': 
The decomposition of  a crystal is not necessarily impure at all.  The 
fermentation of  a wholesome liquid begins to admit the idea slightly; 
the decay of  leaves yet more; of  flowers, more; of  animals, with 
1:yeater painfulness and telTibleness in exact proportion to their 
original vitality; and the foulest of  all corruption is that of  the body of 
man (7.205-6). 
Life and death, rather than Turner or the old masters, provided examples by which 
Ruskin described his crucial law of  composition.  His concern was not with abstract 
aesthetic concepts, but with the application of 'The Law of  Help , to everyday life. 
These underlying social concerns came to the forefront ofthe discussion in a 
key passage of  the chapter, where Ruskin asked readers to understand 'The Law of 
Help' by observing a mundane feature of  urban life, 'an ounce or two of  the blackest 
slime of a beaten footpath on a rainy day, near a large manufacturing town' (7.207). 
Examining its component parts - clay, soot, sand, and water - Ruskin described how 
nature and humanity compared in their ability to compose from them.  Humanity 
had managed to combine the elements in such a way that they were 'at helpless war 
with each other, and destroy reciprocally each other's nature and power'.  This 
'absolute type of  impurity' brought shame to humanity, and should lead it to 
consider an organic model of  composition.  If  nature were permitted to 'follow its 
37.  Bizup, p. 86. 
99 manoeuvre, his insistence that the same metaphor of  co-operation held equally good 
for art, environment, and community implied that they were connected at a deeper 
level.  Ruskin's narrative strategies were often concerned with directing readerly 
attention to hidden connections between discourses.  By demonstrating that an ounce 
of  footpath dirt was linked to the abiding cultural and political questions of  his day, 
Ruskin implied that the remedy for social ills lay in recognising the need for a model 
of  cohesion and mutuality located in nature: 
A pure or holy state of  anything, therefore, is that in which all its parts 
are helpful or consistent.  They mayor may not be homogeneous.  The 
highest or organic purities are composed of  many elements in an 
entirely helpful state.  The highest and first law of  the universe - and 
the other name of  life is, therefore, "help."  The other name of  death is 
"separation."  Government and co-operation are in all things and 
eternally the laws oflife.  Anarchy and competition, eternally, and in 
all things, the laws of  death (7. 207). 
This critical statement offers a window into the elision of  art, environment, and 
politics in Ruskin's work, and the central place of  ecology in shaping his response to 
these and other issues.  In Sherburne's view, this chapter 'places Ruskin in the 
tradition of  Romantic organicism and reveals his application ofthe organic 
metaphor to painting', but as I have already noted Sherburne describes Ruskin's 
organicism as static.  The works discussed in this chapter call into question his claim 
that 'Ruskin's unwillingness to dwell on the dynamic implications of  the organic 
metaphor reveals itself in the content as well as the form of  his thinking'.  38  Surely 
the power of  Ruskin's description of  crystallisation in 'The Law of  Help'  , of  tree 
growth in 'Of  Leaf  Beauty', and of  the products of  oxidisation in 'The Work of  Iron' 
rely entirely on dynamism?  These works presented not only a dynamic vision of 
38.  Sherburne, p. 11. 
101 to the advancing scientific vision embodied by Darwin.
3 
In the past two decades, this impression has not been sufficiently challenged. 
Terry Gifford acknowledges Ruskin 'as a contributor to the foundation of  ecological 
thinking', but his description of  him as 'a minor link in the tradition linking 
Wordsworth and Morris' hardly leads one to imagine someone able to absorb the 
new theories of  Victorian science.
4  Bramwell argues that 'Ruskin was too 
unscientific, too religiously moral in his political prescriptions to qualify as an 
ecologist', although she concedes that 'his influence on the political ideals of  British 
ecologism can scarcely be overestimated'.  For Bramwell, Ruskin's impact was on 
social, not scientific, aspects of  ecologism.  Hanley argues that 'Ruskin is distinctly 
not an ecologist, if  that is taken to mean someone for whom human culture is 
secondary to the dictates of  purely physical laws " but his definition is rather 
reductive: ecology is not purely concerned with physical laws, but, as Bramwell 
points out, is also about the management of  natural systems and human need. 
Hanley is correct ifhe means to say that Ruskin never achieved a completely 
biocentric view, but this does not necessarily mean he was not significantly 
immersed in ecological discourse.
5 
In the continuing conviction that Ruskin was not particularly competent at 
science, there appears also to be a residual manifestation of  a Victorian belief that 
his talents in what were perceived as archetypically 'female' areas of  nature study 
(collection, illustration, description, and popularisation) could not equip him for the 
'manly' world of  vigorous, logical science; just as his training in what was 
commonly perceived as the 'feminine' field of  art criticism made him ineligible, 
3.  A view summed up by Bloom, who spoke of  his 'passion for close observation of  nature, for 
the study of  geology and botany, and for incessant sketching and versifying' (Bloom, p. xii). 
4.  Terry Gifford, 'Conclusion', in Wheeler (ed.) (pp. 187-94), p.  189. 
5.  Bramwell, p. 96; Hanley, 'The discourse of  natural beauty', p.  18. 
106 There is a mixture oftruth and over-generalization here: Roman Catholics, 
Calvinists, and Evangelicals certainly mistrusted Natural Theology, but during the 
first four decades of  the nineteenth century, Anglicans like Buckland remained 
confident that it was possible to accommodate science and religion.  Evangelicals 
preferred 'unrepentant mystery' to science, but Ruskin - brought up in their number 
did not seem to share this outlook, as I shall demonstrate subsequently.  Nor did he 
follow Buckland's Catastrophism very closely, even though he persistently called 
for an alliance between science and religion prior to 1860.  Why, then, did Ruskin 
respond to Lyell, who, Bowker argued, 'saw his foundation work as taking the 
history of  the Earth out of  the hands of  religious fundamentalists', rather than 
Buckland, who sought to reconcile faith and natural philosophy?13 
One of  the most well known of  Ruskin's letters, to Henry Acland in 1851, 
included an oft-quoted passage: 
If only the Geologists would let me alone, I could do very well, but 
those dreadful Hammers!  I hear the clink of  them at the end of  every 
cadence of  the Bible verses. 
Ruskin admitted to Acland, who was suffering his own religious crisis, that 'the old 
Evangelical fonnulre' of  his fonner faith was 'being beaten into mere gold leaf, and 
flutters in weak rags from the letter of  its old fonns' (36. 115).  Unlike other 
Evangelicals Ruskin was unable to ignore the implications of  modem, materialist 
science.  His doubts surfaced long before 1851, and Lyell's theory was one of  their 
principal causes.  In a letter of 1843, Ruskin supported'  geological evidence of  death 
extending for an infinite series of  ages before man' in ways that suggest major 
doubts about the Mosaic timescale proposed by Buckland: 
13.  Bowker, p. 483. 
112 public work need not be seen as in conflict.  Ruskin's correspondence offers 
glimpses of  his inner conflicts over issues of  science and religion at their most acute 
moments, and therefore should be accorded considerable weight not as texts which 
contradict the tenor of  his published works, but which have more freedom to express 
his feelings.  There was not a binary opposition in operation.  My argument about 
Ruskin's attitude to materialist science and Christianity would rightly be deemed to 
be limited if  it rested on correspondence alone.  However, it is only one component 
in a series of  observations drawn from the range of  Ruskin's published and 
unpublished works, all of  which point towards the same conclusions.  That his early 
position in these letters was absolutely consistent with the public position he took in 
debates over the 'Higher Criticism' of  the 1860s is crucial to validating the status of 
the letters.  The views Ruskin put forward in the 1843 correspondence conflicted in 
considerable measure with his public views only after 1870.  Only then did it 
become necessary to attempt to repudiate the approaches and methods he had 
pioneered in his 1843 discussion of  the Garden of  Eden.  Finally, other critics have 
argued for the importance of  these 'private' texts.  Cook and Wedderburn were 
convinced that 'the note of  aggressive Protestantism' in other correspondence from 
earlier in the 1840s had disappeared from these letters, and that 'the freer 
interpretation of  Scripture towards which he inclines in the Essay on the Fall' 
evinced 'his gradual emancipation from some of  the bonds of  his early creed'.  They 
argue convincingly that this placed Ruskin as a pioneer ofthe German 'higher 
criticism' that would emerge in the 1860s (1. liii).  Conner regards these letters as a 
'significant' departure for 'the doubt-racked Ruskin' who 'carne down against the 
literal Biblical version accepted by his parents in favour of  the heretical viewpoint 
based on geological evidence'  .28  Spear argues that these early correspondences 
showed that Ruskin felt the Bible should be 'constantly reinterpreted in the light of 
28.  Conner, p.  19. 
123 flowers was a side issue when one considered that they have 'nothing essential' 
except their reproductive properties (1. 475).  The straightforwardly functional basis 
of  this approach articulated a rigidly materialist methodology.  Aesthetic aspects of 
plant life were dismissed in favour of  a morphological dissection and an account of 
functional process.  A key feature of  nineteenth-century materialist science was its 
emphasis on dynamic process, something Ruskin highlighted in the following 
paragraph, when he argued that leaves and flowers functioned to produce new life: 
You imply, therefore, growth - change of  state  and preparation for 
a succeeding existence.  Therefore, when you say'  a tree,' you mean 
a growing, changing, and preparing thing (1.476). 
Flowers and fruit were designed to prepare for the growth of  another tree, which 
would replace the parent, so that 'every bud and blossom of  the parent tree implies 
and necessitates its destruction'.  Ruskin quickly linked reproduction and death: 
When you say a preparing thing, a fructifying thing, you mean a 
dying thing [ ...  ] Whenever you speak of  a tree, you speak of  death. 
That which has not in it the beginning and genn of  death, is not a tree 
(1. 476). 
Having calmly recognised the importance of  death in natural systems, Ruskin's 
robust logic proceeded towards the following uncomfortable choice: 
Ifthere were trees in the Garden of  Eden there was death; or, ifthere 
was not death, they could not have had leaves, nor flowers, nor any of 
those organs of  growth or gennination which now constitute the 
essence of  a tree.  People wi11look very grave at you, indeed, if  you 
hint that there were no flowers in the Garden, and yet the very 
meaning ofthe word flower is-something to supply death (1. 476). 
Ruskin's commitment to rigorous scientific enquiry called scripture into question, 
125 'Natural History' differed from 'General Physics' (which 'examines, abstractedly, 
each of  the properties of  those moveable and extended beings which we call bodies') 
and from chemistry ('a science almost wholly experimental') because both of  these 
disciplines, unlike Natural History, consisted 'in isolating bodies, reducing them to 
their utmost simplicity' in order to calculate, experiment upon, and observe their 
properties 'for the purpose of  establishing a body of  doctrine, and, if  possible, of 
referring the whole to one single law'.  This could also act as a reasonable 
description, in fact, of  Linnaeus' s attempts to regularise the life sciences by adopting 
the examination of  abstract properties characteristic of  the 'hard sciences'.  Natural 
History, as conceived by Cuvier, was 'confined to objects which do not allow of 
rigorous calculation, or of  precise measurement'.  Although Natural History 'should, 
in strictness, employ the same modes of  procedure as the general sciences', it was 
generally 'very seldom' the case that the subjects of  Natural History were 'so little 
complex as to permit of  it'  .40  For Linnaeus, the distinction between physical and 
life sciences was not acute, as both rested upon the same quantitative methodologies. 
Cuvier rejected the call to privilege quantitative over qualitative measurement, and 
recognised that plants and animals were both too variable and too complex to be 
studied in the same way as particles and atoms.  He centred the legitimacy of 
Natural History on an anatomical procedure that could - he believed  offer a more 
valid, rational, and rigorous analysis of  organisms than a Linnaean approach. 
For Cuvier, the most crucial distinction between physical and life sciences 
was the fact that the latter studied organisms that existed within a web of  relations, 
from which they could not be extrapolated.  The physicist could isolate atoms from 
surrounding matter without falsification, but the Natural Historian was unable 'to 
subtract successively from each condition, and so reduce the problem to its 
elements; but he must take it entire, with all its conditions at once, and can analyze 
40.  ibid, pp. 1-2,2. 
l32 from one edge of  the horizon to the other, like a woven garment; and 
shaken into deep falling folds, as the robes droop from a king's 
shoulders (6.  119). 
The passage continued in breathless celebration of  uplands for a further page, full of 
lavish description, and climaxing in an assertion that highland scenery was 'more 
necessary to his happy existence than all the level and easily subdued land which he 
rejoices to possess' (6.  120).  He rejected the idea that utility was the main purpose 
of  nature, and directly dismissed depictions of  nature produced in earlier ages: 
In the seventeenth century, one ofthe most enlightened of  the 
religious men of  his day (Fleming), himself a native of  a mountain 
country, casting about for some reason to explain to himself  to 
existence of  mountains, and prove their harmony with the general 
perfectness of  the providential government of  creation, can light upon 
this reason only, 'they are inhabited by the beasts.' (6.  120) 
The shadow of  this fear of  mountains, and of  nature itself, a shadow that had 
continued to haunt Irving and Ryle, was cast aside by Ruskin, perhaps from the first 
moment he experienced carriage travel in the Lakes and gazed at Turner.  His was 
an experience of  landscape formed in part by Romanticism, in part by a Christianity 
softened from its original Evangelicalism, and in part by a modem, scientific vision. 
In this synthesis, I would argue, Ruskin departed significantly from Evangelicalism, 
but also from that other major manifestation of  Victorian religious attitudes to 
nature, the movement of  Natural Theology. 
VII. Natural theology 
It is only by a simultaneous contemplation of  matter and mind that 
Natural History rises to its true character and dignity, and attains its 
noblest end, namely, the indication throughout the whole of  creation 
150 discourses might control, and whether science might attempt to increase its 
significance and power by annexing those areas of  culture which had traditionally 
been the preserve of  clerics, art critics, and moralists.  The tool by which these 
annexations were effected was materialism, which operated on the monistic premiss 
that everything was reducible to matter.  In the changing climate ofthe 1870s and 
1880s, the territorial advances of  materialism would be considerable.  Ruskin's work 
of  this period should be read as an attempt to reunite this shattered alliance, but his 
attempts in this respect became increasingly desperate, forlorn and pessimistic, 
giving way in tum to outright condemnation ofthe 'evils' of  modern science.  Given 
its central role in bringing about these changes, and in forcing Ruskin to reconfigure 
his scientific outlook, it will be necessary to address the issue of  Darwinism more 
directly in the following chapter. 
In showing that Ruskin was out of  sympathy with Linnaean Natural History, 
Natural Theology, and Evangelicalism, I wished to understand how this might affect 
a reading of  his response to nineteenth century materialism.  In no way do I aim to 
brush aside Ruskin's vocal opposition in later life to these strands of  nineteenth 
century science.  However, by understanding that Ruskin's earlier attitude to 
materialism was less antagonistic than his later views, it is possible to dismiss the 
notion that Ruskin's later distaste for materialism was merely a development of, 
rather than a shift from, his early attitudes, and permits one to re-investigate the 
nature of  Ruskin's Darwinian crisis in a fairer and a more revealing way. 
163 aid was possible.  The latter was withheld because the day's work for six men which 
Ruskin claimed could cleanse the pools 'is never given, nor, I suppose, will be; nor 
will any joy be possible to heart of  man, for evennore, about those wells of  English 
waters' (18.387).  In a fitting postscript to the narrative, Ruskin paid for the 
cleansing of  the pools, only to find that within a few years the scene had reverted to 
lapsarian pollution.
9 
Leaving the pools of  Wandel, Ruskin turned into Croydon High Street, only 
to find something like the triumph of  polished iron of  which he had warned his 
audience in Tunbridge Wells in 1858.  Eight years on from that lecture, he described 
a public house, 'built in so wise manner, that a recess oftwo feet was left below its 
front windows, between them and the street-pavement'.  Although this area was 'too 
narrow for any possible use', the pUblican had 'by way of  making this two feet depth 
of  freehold land more expressive of  the dignity of  an establishment for the sale of 
spirituous liquors', added 'an imposing iron railing, having four or five spear-heads 
to the yard of  it, and six feet high; containing as much iron and iron-work, indeed, as 
could well be put into the space'.  This had produced 'a protective receptacle of 
refuse; cigar ends, and oyster-shells, and the like, such as an open-handed English 
street-populace habitually scatters' (18. 387).  The greatest waste was that the 
human energy that had gone into their production 'would have cleansed the 
Carshalton pools three times over'.  Worse still, this was not healthful, outdoor 
work, but 'work, partly cramped and perilous, in the mine; partly grievous and 
horrible, at the furnace; partly foolish and sedentary, of  ill-taught students making 
bad designs'.  Like the spoiling of  the pools, the iron railings represented work that 
was 'venomous, deathful, and miserable', and which moved humanity so far from 
the lessons Ruskin sought in nature that it moved him to attack, in the remainder of 
9.  Ruskin's own efforts to cleanse the spring, undermined by continued dumping and the 
intransigence oflocal officials, had to be abandoned in 1877 (see 22.533). 
172 Whilst this defence was not entirely convincing, their attempt to distance Ruskin's 
natural history from mainstream science rang with more truth: 
He was not so ignorant or narrow-minded as to suppose that there was 
no proper place for the science which classifies and analyses, in accord 
with, or in the effort to discover origins and essence [  ... ] Ruskin's 
attitude was simply that this was a kind of  science which did not interest 
him, and which he never pretended to study, but that there was another 
kind of  science, which, for purposes of  general education, he held to be 
more important (25. xxxix). 
Ruskin's editors rightly identify Ruskin's point of  departure from professional 
science.  The value oftheir comments is twofold.  Firstly, they acknowledge 
Ruskin's resistance to a division between science and wider culture, one ofthe 
principal results of  the 'advancement' of  science in the latter half of  the nineteenth 
century.  Secondly, they do not condemn Ruskin as a bumbling amateur, unable to 
comprehend materialist science. 
Building on the more tenable aspects of  Cook and Wedderburn's critique, I 
would conclude that Ruskin deliberately chose not to embrace natural selection, 
despite his intellectual kinship and sympathy with key elements of  modem science. 
He was clearly unable to reside comfortably with the rump of ill-conceived clerical 
opposition to Darwin which characterised much ofthe criticism in newspapers, 
periodicals, and church pulpits during the latter half ofthe nineteenth century.  His 
support for Colenso in the 1870s offered persuasive evidence that he continued to 
disregard clerical orthodoxy.  Ruskin's conscious, dogmatic opposition to Darwin 
led him to entirely reconfigure his approach to natural history.  This involved a 
complex of  related changes.  In a number of  late works, there was an increase in 
politicised environmentalism, and in direct support for specific campaigns against 
railways, reservoirs, quarries and other encroachments on natural landscapes.  These 
190 beginning with a physiological and functional account of  plant existence, and 
moving outward to consideration of  lessons for humanity.  For example, he 
described the 'three great functions' of  roots, before outlining what readers should 
draw from this in their own lives (25.219).  His remarks on roots showed that he 
maintained an eye for the ecological interconnections of  nature: 
Roots bind together the ragged edges of  rocks as a hem does the tom 
edge of  a dress [ ...  ] While it is always dangerous to pass under a 
treeless edge of  overhanging crag, as soon as it has become beautiful 
with trees, it is safe also (25. 221). 
Ruskin focused on the implications of  this at a microcosmic level (the overhanging 
crag) and the macrocosmic level (larger habitats and topographies): 
The surfaces of  mountains are dissolved and disordered, by rain and 
frost, and chemical decomposition, into mere heaps of  loose stones 
on their desolate summits; but, where the forests grow, soil 
accumulates and disintegrations cease (25.221). 
Ruskin drew attention to the need to avoid deforestation: 'by cutting down forests on 
great mountain slopes', Ruskin argued, 'not only is the climate destroyed, but the 
danger of superficiallandslip fearfully increased' (25. 221-2).  This understanding 
of  the importance of  protecting microclimates, as well as maintaining the structural 
integrity of  mountains, was perceptive ecological thinking. 
Only once Ruskin's functional account of  roots had embraced a discussion of 
their gathering and storing of  water and nourishment did Ruskin tum to the 'pretty 
example of  patience for us' in the work of  roots (25. 225).  Other chapters followed 
the same movement from material to moral investigation.  The first half of  Chapter 
VIII, 'The Stern' recalled 'Of  Leaf  Beauty' in its tone, style, and illustration, and in 








Page 231 missing and resources.  It is already clear to me that Ruskin was one of  the principle 
influences on Patrick Geddes, a major figure in this period of  ecological activism, 
and that others within the anarchist wings of  the ecology movement at this time may 
have been either profoundly influenced by Ruskin or produced work that resembled 
his in aspects of  their respective philosophies.  Both Prince Peter Kropotkin and, to a 
lesser extent, Elisee Reclus seem to owe a debt to the work of  Ruskin, particularly in 
terms ofthe genesis of  the ideas ofthe former on luxury, the relationship between 
science and economics, and of  mutualism in natural and social communities.  To 
fully explore these ideas, and to fully trace the (patchily) documented impact of 
Ruskin on other figures within ecologism and utopianism, including Mahatma 
Gandhi, Leo Tolstoy, the physicist Frederick Soddy, and D. H. Lawrence, would 
provide an almost entirely new context for Ruskin studies, and one which would 
considerably reinforce my central contention about Ruskin's immersion in the wider 
cultural formation of ecology. 
Ecology is of course a continuing movement or formation, and as I briefly 
argued at the close of  the second chapter in my remarks on Bateson, Ruskin's 
kinships should be traced not only (and not primarily) retrospectively towards 
eighteenth century science, but much more powerfully towards twentieth century 
thought on landscape, aesthetics, and culture.  The resurgence in the past twenty 
years of  what might be termed post-structuralist thought about landscape has rested 
upon the idea, articulated recently by Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, that 'it is 
impossible to extricate the landscape from its cultural and social associations' 
because 'the meanings of  verbal, visual and built landscapes have a complex 
interwoven history.'  Their contention that 'every study of  a landscape further 
transforms its meaning, depositing yet another layer of  cultural representation' 
immediately seems reminiscent of  Ruskin's own characteristic practice, and his 
refusal to separate the scientific, aesthetic, and cultural aspects of  studies of  nature 
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